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Abstract 
Fiber to the Home (FTTH) describes a set of emerging technologies with the potential to 
affect the competitive landscape in local access.  On the one hand, the high cost of 
deploying fiber and associated equipment all the way to the residence suggests limitations 
on the extent of facilities-based competition among FTTH networks.  On the other hand, 
FTTH opens up new possibilities for service-level competition, defined as the sharing of 
a single network infrastructure by multiple higher-layer service providers, whether of the 
same or different services.  The high and ever-increasing transmission capacity of fiber, 
and the lack of legacy allocations of that capacity in new network designs, together 
present a much greater degree of technical flexibility for network sharing than is found in 
the legacy telephone and cable networks primarily used for local access today. 
Yet technology is hardly an exogenous factor that independently shapes future local 
access competition; the regulatory environment also plays a key role.  By shaping 
expectations about future competitive requirements, current regulations influence 
network operators' deployment choices among competing FTTH technologies, as well as 
design choices made by vendors and standards bodies for technologies still under 
development. 
The current regulatory approach to FTTH is far from consistent.  Network operators 
trialing FTTH currently include Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs), 
competitive access providers of various sorts (including CLECs), rural/independent 
telephone companies, and municipalities.  This paper reviews the rules related to service-
level competition that apply to each of these institutional categories, as well as to 
incumbent cable operators that are also likely to play a future role in FTTH.  These rules 
vary from the detailed FCC orders on resale and unbundled network elements (UNEs) 
that apply to ILECs, to varying state-level restrictions on entry that apply to 
municipalities.  In essence, the paper finds that if current regulatory trends continue, 
asymmetries in the regulation of service-level competition will be on steroids by the time 
FTTH starts being more commonly deployed.  This finding is especially problematic if 
fiber’s high deployment costs and potential for integrated services lead to highly 
monopolistic local access markets. 
We view the high-level problem as a lack of clear regulatory commitment to service-level 
competition as a long-term policy goal, independent of the specific local access 
technology or the nature of the particular service(s) offered.  Current regulatory 
requirements are either non-existent, or extremely detailed and technology- and service-
specific (e.g. UNEs).  We argue that neither of these approaches is likely to achieve the 
desired result for FTTH, given the current state of flux in emerging FTTH technology. 
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Introduction 
Fiber to the Home (FTTH) describes a set of emerging technologies whose common 
element is the deployment of a fiber-optic line all the way to the residential customer’s 
premises.  Although some of these technologies have been talked about for at least 10-20 
years,1 the emergence of a significant market for residential Internet access has breathed 
new life into the discussions.  Practical interest in FTTH is resurgent, based on now-
proven consumer demand for residential broadband Internet access, the continuing 
development and popularity of ever more bandwidth-hungry Internet applications such 
peer-to-peer file sharing and video distribution, and ongoing price-performance 
improvements in optical networking technology.  In the context of these trends, FTTH is 
viewed by many stakeholders as the soundest basis for a more future-proof local access 
infrastructure.   
In the second section of this paper, we explain why we see FTTH as the eventual future 
of residential broadband infrastructure, at least for fixed (wired) networks.   We review 
current experiments with FTTH in the U.S. and discuss the motivations of organizations 
currently or potentially deploying FTTH.  These organizations include incumbent 
telephone and cable operators, new entrants building alternative facilities, and 
municipalities, typically in the form of municipal utilities. 
The likely emergence of FTTH networks makes it important to consider what effect they 
may have on future local access competition.  On the one hand, the high cost of 
deploying fiber and associated equipment all the way to the residence suggests limitations 
on the extent of facilities-based competition (Reed, 1991).  As with today’s residential 
broadband Internet access, duopoly would be the best outcome, in communities in which 
both cable and telephone networks migrate to FTTH.  Monopoly is also a likely outcome, 
however, because FTTH can create a significant first mover advantage.  Fiber’s high 
bandwidth capacity means that one network operator can provide multiple services (e.g. 
data, voice and video), leaving less room for entrants to offer novel services to attract 
potential customers.  By this argument, the first network to migrate, or the first network 
to be built from scratch, precludes the ability of would-be competitors to recoup their 
investment in FTTH.2 
On the other hand, FTTH opens up new possibilities for service-level competition, 
defined as the sharing of a single network infrastructure by multiple higher-layer service 
providers, whether of the same or different services.  Emerging FTTH technologies 
present a degree of technical flexibility much greater than that of the legacy telephone 
and cable networks primarily used for broadband today.  The high and ever-increasing 
transmission capacity of fiber, and the lack of legacy allocations of that capacity in new 
                                                 
1 See, for example, (Reed 1991) and the references therein. 
2 Fiber need not run all the way to the home for a network operator to offer integrated services.  However, 
an all-fiber network offers the greatest capacity and flexibility for combining multiple services. 
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network designs, mean that FTTH capacity can potentially be shared not just among 
multiple users and services, but also among multiple service providers.3  For example, 
customers might buy Internet access from several different ISPs, all delivering service 
over the same FTTH network.  Or, they might buy Internet access and video (e.g. cable 
TV) services over the same network, but from different companies.  Yet another form of 
service-level competition might arise if the data transmission capabilities delivered over 
FTTH are high enough to support new modes of usage, such as switched digital video4 
and video telephony, that indirectly compete with more traditional cable TV and 
telephony services. 
Yet technology is hardly an exogenous factor that independently shapes future local 
access competition.  The regulatory environment also plays a key role.  By shaping 
expectations about future competitive requirements, current regulations influence 
network operators’ deployment choices among competing FTTH technologies.  At a 
more basic level, regulatory expectations also shape design choices made by vendors and 
standards bodies for technologies still under development.  Thus current regulations 
influence how likely it is that FTTH’s potential to support more service-level competition 
will actually be realized. 
The current regulatory approach to FTTH is far from consistent.  Requirements for 
support of service-level competition vary tremendously depending on the type of service 
(voice, data or video) and the identity of the network operator.  The third section of this 
paper reviews the details of this heterogeneity.  The paper concludes with a discussion of 
why this inconsistent approach is problematic, and potential policy directions that could 
improve this situation. 
FTTH: The Future of Residential Broadband 
Despite much hype, actual deployments of FTTH in the U.S. remain at the relatively rare 
stage, in which TPRC authors can still list a reasonable sample of trials in a short table 
(see Table 1). 
                                                 
3 See (Tseng 2001, Chapter 4) for further detail on this point. 
4 Also known as Video over IP.  See (Abe 2000) pp.334-336 for a description of Switched Digital Video. 
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Type of 
Organization Provider Location(s) Status Technology 
Alternative facility 
provider Clearworks.net 
TX (new 
developments) 
Announced 
deployments.  
Unknown status. 
Ethernet over 
Active Star 
(FTTH) + HFC 
(for video) 
Alternative facility 
provider (CLEC) 
Western Integrated 
Networks, LLC. 
(WINFirst) 
Austin, TX;  San 
Antonio, TX; 
Sacramento, CA 
Planning network 
deployments in 
Austin, San Antonio, 
Sacramento 
Ethernet over 
Active Star 
(FTTH) + HFC 
(for video) 
Alternative facility 
provider HomeFiber 
Palo Alto, CA (new 
developments) Unknown 
Ethernet over 
Active Star 
Alternative facility 
provider FiberHood Palo Alto, CA Running trial 
Ethernet over 
PON 
Alternative facility 
provider Vialight 
Redmond, WA (new 
developments) 
Currently offering 
services 
Ethernet over 
Active Star 
ILEC BellSouth Dunwoody, GA Running trial ATM over PON 
ILEC Verizon Not public Running trial 
Ethernet over 
PON 
Rural/Independent 
Phone Company 
Blair Telephone Co., 
Huntel Engineering 
Blair, Nebraska (new 
developments) 
Currently offering 
services ATM over PON 
Rural/Independent 
Phone Company Rye Telephone Co. 
Colorado City, CO 
(new developments) 
Currently offering 
services ATM over PON 
Municipal Utility 
City of Palo Alto 
Utilities Palo Alto, CA Building trial network 
Ethernet over 
PON 
Municipal Utility Grant County PUC Grant County, WA 
Currently offering 
services 
Ethernet over 
Active Star 
 
Table 1: U.S. FTTH Deployments 
Several trends, however, point to FTTH becoming less rare in the foreseeable future: 
1. Existing network operators are pushing fiber ever closer to subscribers.  In order 
to reduce maintenance costs, increase capacity and support new services such as 
broadband Internet access, cable TV and telephony, cable and telephone network 
operators have been deploying more fiber and pushing it closer to the subscriber.  For 
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example, the Hybrid Fiber Coax (HFC) networks generally built out by cable 
operators in the mid-late 1990’s typically brought fiber to a “neighborhood” (FTTN) 
of about 500-2,000 homes (Gillett, 1997).  Recent overbuilders such as RCN typically 
bring fiber to the “curb” (FTTC), serving clusters of 20-200 homes.  A logical result 
of this evolution is for fiber eventually to reach all the way to the customers’ 
premises. 
2. Fiber may already be more economical than copper for greenfield sites.  Because 
a large portion of the costs of a new network lie in its installation,5 in new 
developments the cost differential to deploy fiber all the way to the end user may be 
negligible.  It may even be favorable when the comparison factors in life cycle 
(operational) costs, and/or the option that an all-fiber network grants by giving 
providers more flexibility to meet the uncertainties of future demand.6  The value of 
this option can be realized with a variety of incremental strategies, including laying 
fiber to the end user premises but not making it visible to subscribers in the form of 
new services, thereby reducing the cost of end-user equipment needed in advance of 
proven demand.  Such strategies are also being adopted in areas where existing 
networks are being largely rebuilt as part of routine maintenance. 
3. Communications infrastructure is increasingly seen by communities as essential 
to their economic development.  Demand for advanced telecommunications services 
is hardly limited to high-density urban communities, yet these are the areas where the 
market brings them soonest (Gillett and Lehr, 1999; Gabel and Kwan, 2000).  More 
sparsely populated areas have come to view availability delays as a disadvantage that 
threatens their ability to attract and retain businesses and residents.7  In some cases, 
this rationale has led communities to build their own local access network, just as 
they assume responsibility for water, roads and other infrastructure.  When the goal is 
community economic development rather than profit, FTTH’s advantages in 
providing advanced services and future-proofing are especially appealing. 
These trends are evident in Table 1.  About half of the deployments listed target new 
housing developments.  Grant County, WA and Palo Alto, CA lead the trend toward 
municipally developed networks.8 
Of additional interest in Table 1 are the different types of organizations involved in 
deploying FTTH networks.  Potential FTTH network providers include the incumbent 
cable and telephone operators as well as new entrants such as competitive local exchange 
                                                 
5 FTTH will primarily be deployed where the provider can avoid trenching—for example, in new builds, 
where trenches are already being dug for other utilities, and in areas where access to aerial plant is 
available. 
6 [*** Insert citation(s) here. ***] 
7 See, for example, the rationales for the various “Connect” projects to develop alternative broadband 
infrastructure in New England.  These projects are linked from http://www.mtpc.org, the web site of the 
Massachusetts Technology Collaborative. 
8 A number of other municipalities have undertaken telecommunications infrastructure projects; these are 
the only two communities we are aware of that have brought fiber all the way to the home.  See (Strover 
and Berquist, 1999). 
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carriers (CLECs), other competitive access providers, utilities and municipalities.  
Motivations and strategies for deployment vary greatly among the different providers and 
deployment scenarios.  The rest of this section reviews the trend toward FTTH within 
each of these categories. 
[* Following sections to be edited for consistency *] 
ILEC 
Telephone companies have several motivations to replace the existing telephone 
infrastructure with Fiber to the Home including lower maintenance costs and the ability 
to provide services such as very high speed data access and video that are not well 
supported by the current telephone network.  Also, as the old infrastructure needs repair, 
telephone companies are incrementally replacing the copper wiring with fiber.  However, 
currently advanced services are not offered even though the infrastructure may be 
upgraded to fiber, because of the high costs of replacing the customer equipment. 
A couple of ILECs have deployed FTTH trial networks. Bell South has a trial serving 400 
homes in a suburb of Atlanta, and Verizon is running a FTTH trial in an undisclosed 
location on the East Coast. 
Alternative facility provider 
Competitive providers have varying strategies and business models for the deployment of 
Fiber to the Home networks.  The different providers vary by the type of services they 
provide.  Some competitive providers provide only data services.  These companies are 
known as Competitive Access Providers. 
Other companies provide a full set of services over the network including telephone, 
cable TV, and sometimes, advanced services such as neighborhood Intranet and video on 
demand.  A CLEC is a provider that is licensed to provide telephone service, and is 
bound by the common carriage rules in the Telecommunications Act that apply to local 
exchange carriers outlined above. 
These providers often target greenfield sites.  For example, companies such as 
ClearWorks.net and ViaLight offer voice, video and data services to new developments, 
teaming up with a real estate developer to provide the network to homes in a private 
development.  Usually the developer gives them some kind of guarantee for the number 
of homes that will hook up to the network.  In some cases, they may get exclusive rights 
for a period of time.  In this way they gain first mover advantage.   
Companies known as overbuilders deploy networks in existing neighborhoods providing 
a third wire into the home.  Most of these companies are deploying HFC systems even 
though network installation costs do not differ significantly whether they are deploying 
coaxial cables or fiber.  However, the total cost of Fiber to the Home is still too expensive 
for most of these providers.  FTTH will become more viable for overbuilders as 
equipment costs come down.  One exception is Western Integrated Networks (WINFirst), 
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which has obtained cable licenses in various cities in Texas and California announced 
plans is to build a combined HFC and FTTH network where coaxial cable carries the 
television signals and fiber carries data and voice into the home. 
Rural/independent telco 
Some independent telephone companies in rural areas have adopted Fiber to the Home 
technology.  For example, Rye Telephone Company in Colorado and Huntel Engineering 
offer cable TV, telephone and Internet access to their customers in new housing 
developments.9 
Municipal utility 
Utilities (especially electric) are looking to broaden their business strategy into 
telecommunications, especially since they often have much of the infrastructure already 
in place.  In fact, many of these organizations have already deployed fiber networks 
connecting their own facilities.  Some lease dark fiber to other organizations and 
businesses.  Some utilities want to build out their networks to individual homes and 
businesses to support applications such as automated metering.  Since these applications 
do not take much bandwidth, they can use these networks to offer telecommunications 
services.   
Utilities have certain advantages over other potential competitive providers. For one 
thing, they already have staff with the expertise in the deployment and maintenance of 
fiber networks.  They have access to the poles and rights-of-way.  They have 
relationships with existing customers and also have billing support systems in place.  
However, utilities lack experience in telecommunications, so they may partner with 
another company to offer telecommunications services.  For example, overbuilders may 
partner with electrical utilities in order to obtain rights-of-way.  RCN’s partnership with 
Boston Edison is an example of this type of partnership. 
 
In order to stimulate competition, some local governments are directly investing in 
telecommunications infrastructure, including local access networks.  These municipalities 
form public/private partnerships to offer services over these facilities.  These local 
governments are building competitive alternatives to the incumbent telephone and cable 
TV infrastructure.   
Municipalities build telecommunications infrastructure for reasons beyond pure profit.  
Municipalities upgrade telecommunications infrastructure with the hope of attracting 
residents and businesses to their communities by offering access to advanced 
telecommunications services.  Some municipalities, especially in rural communities, lack 
advanced services and feel they cannot rely on the private sector to provide them.  These 
                                                 
9 Huntel Engineering http://www.huntelengineering.com and Rye Telephone Company http:// 
www.fone.net/soco/guide/colocity/rtc/home.html  
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communities have a vested interest providing choice for their citizens, and therefore are 
interested in promoting service level competition over their networks.   
Certain municipalities -- such as Grant County, Washington and Palo Alto, California—
are deploying Fiber to the Home networks in their communities, extending existing 
publicly owned networks into the local loop themselves and partner with private 
companies to provide the services. 
Incumbent cable operators 
Cable television providers have shown less interest than the incumbent telephone 
companies to deploy fiber all the way to the home.  Cable television companies are taking 
a gradual approach to deploying fiber closer to the subscriber.  Cable companies such as 
AT&T are migrating their HFC systems to Fiber to the Curb to allow fewer subscribers to 
share the network.  Eventually, cable companies may migrate to all fiber networks if 
application demand warrants it (especially for upstream bandwidth), if incrementally 
upgrading the network becomes more expensive than deploying fiber all the way, or if 
FTTH offers significant enough savings in operational costs compared with HFC 
networks. 
U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Service-Level Competition 
The current regulatory approach to service-level competition is far from consistent, 
varying by the type of provider and the types of services they offer (Table 2).
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Table 2: U.S. Requirements for support of service-level competition 
  Type of Service 
  Voice Data Video  
ILEC UNEs, collocation and resale (TA’96 §251c) 
· UNEs, collocation and resale 
(TA’96 §251c) 
· Line sharing, DSL UNEs (FCC 
Report & Orders 3 & 4) 
· Separate subsidiary: not (merger 
conditions invalidated by courts; 
but, watch PA) 
3 choices under TA’96 §302 
· None (“cable”): just usual  
broadcast and programming 
rules 
· Hybrid: “open video” 
· VDT: “common carriage 
video”  
Incumbent 
cable operator 
Allow access to rights of way, don’t 
prohibit resale, etc. (“CLEC” rules: 
TA’96 §251b) 
· Statutory: none 
· Court rulings: none 
· ATT v. Portland: locality can’t 
require, but FCC can 
· MediaOne v. Broward County: 
open access violates 1st 
Amendment 
· Merger conditions 
· AOL/TW: FTC consent decree 
(5 years) 
· ATT/TCI/MediaOne: none 
None (1984, 92 cable acts; ineffective 
“leased access”) 
Rural telco None (TA’96 §251f  exemptions pre-empt §251c)10 
None (TA’96 §251f  exemptions pre-
empt §251c) None  
Alternative 
facility 
provider 
Allow access to rights of way, don’t 
prohibit resale, etc. (“CLEC” rules: 
TA’96 §251b) 
None None 
Type of 
Provider 
Municipality 
(typically 
through 
electric utility)  
Unclear whether even allowed 
(differing state laws, pending court 
cases) 
None (although may be locally 
required, de jure or de facto) 
None (although may be locally 
required, de jure or de facto) 
                                                 
10 Cable-telephone cross-ownership restrictions are also lifted for rural telephone companies.  We speculate that companies that are already allowed to provide 
both video and voice services might be more likely to offer integrated services over a future FTTH network. 
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Voice 
[* To be filled in with explanation of Table 2 *] 
Data 
[* To be filled in with explanation of Table 2 *] 
Video 
[* To be filled in with explanation of Table 2 *] 
Competition Policies for Fiber to the Home 
As shown in the previous section, separate regulatory regimes would apply to Fiber to the 
Home depending on the different providers (cable vs. telephone) and the services they 
offer.  However, this regulatory asymmetry is increasingly untenable.  As fiber gets 
deployed deeper into the network, the networks are becoming more similar, both in the 
transmission media and the services they support.  Although asymmetric regulation may 
need to exist in order to level the playing field between various market players, the 
potential differences should reflect differences based on market position (incumbent vs. 
competitor) rather than increasingly irrelevant technological distinctions.11 
There are issues with various specific regulatory approaches as well.  The unbundling 
rules that apply to the telephone network are unworkable with rapidly changing 
technology such as FTTH.   The unbundling requirements that currently apply to the 
telephone network are difficult to implement effectively in the context of rapidly 
changing technologies such as FTTH.   Unbundling FTTH networks will require 
definition of new unbundled network elements (UNEs).    However, many different 
FTTH technology options exist, and no dominant technology has emerged, making it 
difficult to define the network elements much less deciding which should be unbundled.  
It will also be difficult to set costs, since the network costs will vary with changing 
technology.  Furthermore, the most detailed rules are very technology specific.  It is also 
possible that the incumbents would architect their networks so as to circumvent these 
policy restrictions.  
The current FCC’s approach taken towards the cable broadband is reactive rather than 
proactive: the government is waiting to see if competition develops before imposing 
regulation.  However, the problem is that if competition does not develop, any policy 
would have to be enforced within the confines of an anti-competitive market structure 
and technology, restricting the effectiveness of the policy.   An alternative is the “laissez-
faire” approach, where the government would remove the network sharing requirements 
                                                 
11 See (Perucci and Cimatoribus 1997) for a discussion of when asymmetric regulation should be applied. 
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from the incumbent providers for the deployment of Fiber to the Home, in order to 
encourage facilities-based competition.  However, due to the entrenched position of the 
incumbent monopolists, laissez faire will not lead to increased competition.   
Conclusions 
[* Insert policy recommendation and concluding discussion *]. 
Policy makers need to define a consistent policy direction, in advance of technical 
development in order to shape technical choices now, rather than grafting them on later.  
The policy goals regarding service level competition should be set while Fiber to the 
Home technology is still being developed.  Once these requirements are defined, Fiber to 
the Home technology can be designed in such a way that increases the opportunity for 
service level competition.  Different architectures make network sharing harder or easier 
(Table 3). 
Table 3: FTTH Technology Support for Service-Level Competition 
 
Architecture Description What’s Shared 
HomeRun Dedicated fiber per subscriber 
(direct connection between 
subscriber and meet point) 
Meet point.  Customer chooses how 
to use fiber and whom/what to 
connect to. 
Active Star Signals switched at node 
between user and meet point 
(e.g. Ethernet) 
Between meet point and node. 
Passive Star Signal’s power split at node 
between user and meet point 
(virtual bus architecture, e.g. 
FSAN/ATM PON) 
Between meet point and user. 
WDM PON Evolving: Dedicated 
wavelength per … (service, 
provider, or subscriber) 
Depends.  Frequency unbundling, 
maybe. 
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